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WAYE v. TOWNLEY
871 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1989)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1978, Alton Waye was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. After exhausting all state court appeals, Waye
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C.A.
§2254 (West 1977). The district court dismissed Waye's petition.
Waye appealed the district court's dismissal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Waye's primary complaint on appeal to both the Supreme Court
of Virginia and to the federal district court was the following
instruction given to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence in the
guilt phase of Waye's trial:
The court instructs the jury that a man is presumed to
intend that which he does, or which is the immediate or
necessary consequences [sic] of his act.
Waye's attorney neither objected to the instruction at the jury trial
nor raised the issue on Waye's direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 594 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that a
burden-shifting instruction such as the one given at Waye's trial
violated a defendant's right to due process. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Court held that the instruction in Sandstrom violated the
principle stated in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that the
prosecution has the burden of proving each and every element of the
crime with which the defendant is charged. The Sandstrom Court
held that the burden-shifting instruction could be understood by a
reasonable juror as forcing the defendant to show that he had no
intent and, therefore, violated Winship.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Waye's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Fourth Circuit noted that Virginia procedure requires a
Jefendant to lodge a contemporaneous objection at trial to preserve
m issue for review by the Supreme Court of Virginia on appeal. In
iddition, the Court of Appeals stated, the Supreme Court of Virginia
vill not address errors unless they are clearly indicated on appeal.
['he Fourth Circuit, under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct.
1497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977), reasoned that failure to timely object
t trial as required by a state contemporaneous objection rule
brecloses federal habeas corpus review "absent a showing of actual
irejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Id., 433
J.S. at 84, 97 S. Ct. at 2505. The Sykes analysis requires two
howings: first, the defendant must show cause for failure to make a
imely objection, and second, the defendant must show that actual
)rejudice resulted from the failure to object.
The Fourth Circuit's holding represents a complex combination
if three overlapping doctrines: excuse for default at trial in order to
aeet the Sykes test for admission to the federal courts; the two-part
-st for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washing-
qn, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1984); and the
armless error doctrine expressed in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106
!Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. '. 460 (1986). The core of all three doctrines
is the harmless error doctrine. Regardless of whether counsel can
meet the other two tests, if the error was harmless - the verdict would
not have been different even if the error was corrected - then the
defendant loses anyway.
Waye alleged in his petition for federal habeas corpus relief that
his cause for failure to object at trial was the ineffectiveness of his
counsel at trial. The Fourth Circuit rejected Waye's contention,
stating that Waye's ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not
meet the two-prong test for ineffective assistance under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1984).
The Court of Appeals held that, even if Waye could show that his
counsel was "so deficient that he was not functioning as counsel,"
Waye, 871 F.2d at 20 (the first prong of the Strickland test), the
evidence at trial of Waye's intent was so overwhelming that Waye
could not show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional [error], the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Id., quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.
Ct. at 2068 (the second prong of the Strickland test).
The Court of Appeals held that, even if Waye met the Strickland
test, Waye failed to show actual prejudice as required under a Sykes
analysis. Again, the Fourth Circuit stated that the evidence of Waye's
intent to kill was so overwhelming at trial that no possibility of actual
prejudice could remain.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that, even if Waye could meet
Strickland and Sykes, "it is clear that the presumption instruction
charged here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Rose v.
Clark" 478 U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1986).
ANALYSIS
Sandstrom v. Montana was decided after Waye's jury trial.
Therefore, although Waye had a valid constitutional argument to
make, his attorney did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's
thinking on the subject. The jury instruction which the Supreme
Court invalidated in Sandstrom had been routinely given until the
Sandstrom opinion. The Sandstrom court, however, found its
decision to be a logical extension of In Re Winship. Because Winship
was decided before Waye's jury trial, Waye's counsel was charged
with the knowledge of Winship and should have objected to the
instruction. Unfortunately, Waye's counsel did not object. Because
Waye's trial counsel made no contemporaneous objection to the jury
instruction, Waye's only avenue to federal habeas corpus relief was
to complain of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit in this case is illustrative of
the difficult burden a defendant must meet even to get his case heard
by the federal courts. Had Waye's counsel made the necessary
objection at trial and preserved the issue on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, Waye would have been able to complain about the
constitutional error without connecting it to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the federal court would not have
had to address the strict criteria for review under Strickland and
Sykes.
Virginia attorneys representing capital defendants should be
careful not to let any arguably meritorious objections go unmade,
even though the issue will clearly be overruled at the trial court. The
capital appeals process will cover many years, and the claim that may
save a client's life may have been unheard of at the time of trial. With
the benefit of hindsight, Waye had a valid argument that his constitu-
tional rights were violated, but because of the Virginia contempora-
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neous objection rule, Waye could not raise the issue on appeal unless
he could show cause under Sykes. The most common "cause" is an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which requires a defendant to
meet the stringent two-part test of Strickland. Alton Waye was
executed on August 30, 1989.
No one can predict which claims the United States Supreme
Court will recognize in the years to come. Sykes does recognize later
"new law" as an excuse for not raising claims at trial. Nevertheless,
because of Virginia's contemporaneous objection rule, unless a claim
was unheard of before a client's trial, failure to object at trial will
close the door to federal collateral review for a capital defendant. The
only protection the attorney representing a capital defendant can
provide a client is to know all existing law, including "logical
extensions" of that law. This includes the law of your own state, but
also the law of any jurisdiction with similar capital statutes.
Of course, this is impossible. No one has the unlimited time and
resources such a task would require. Nevertheless, federal courts
require such foresight. The attorney's only defense is to use his or her
own sense of fairness to guide making of objections at trial.
Additionally, it is critical to tie every objection to the 6th, 8th
and 14th amendments of the United States Constitution. This is
necessary because, even if an objection was made to the correct issue
at trial, if the court overrules an objection on purely state law
grounds, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Trial counsel must assert a federal basis for every objection. One
arguable basis is the necessity for a heightened degree of reliability in
death penalty cases ("super due process") under the 8th and 14th
amendments and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305
(1976).
As to matters that implicate only state law in non-capital cases,
the United States Supreme Court has sometimes required the higher
standard, and sometimes not. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 586, 99 S.
Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1978), for example, overrode a state
hearsay rule to require consideration of mitigating evidence.
Strickland itself, however, refused to impose a higher standard of
competence for attorneys in capital cases.
Summary and analysis by: Diane U. Montgomery
SPENCER v. COMMONWEALTH
Supreme Court of Virginia
SPENCER I (victim-Tucker): 1989 Va. LEXIS 147, WL 109529 (1989)
and
SPENCER II (victim-Davis): 1989 Va. LEXIS 127, WL 109530 (1989)
The defendant received two separate trials for the murders
of two women. In both of the trials the jury found him guilty of
capital murder and deserving of the death penalty. He appealed the
conviction and sentence of both trials asserting numerous assign-
ments of error. In reviewing the alleged errors the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in two per curiam opinions by Justice Stephenson, affirmed
the conviction and sentence of the defendant and held that "DNA
printing" is both a reliable and admissible form of identification
evidence. In addition, Spencer II reviewed alleged errors pertaining
to the selection of prospective jurors and assignments of error
regarding the admission of evidence.
NOTE: Although they are two separate cases, due to the similarity of
the facts and holdings both decisions will be discussed in a single
summary. Also, all Spencer citations are to LEXIS pages.
FACTS
Timothy Wilson Spencer was arrested and charged with the
rape and murder of both Susan Tucker and Debbie Dudley Davis.
The murders occurred approximately ten weeks apart in 1987. In
each case, Spencer entered the dwellings through a ground floor
window. Both victims were found strangled in their bed, naked or
partially clothed. Each victim was bound in a similar fashion; their
wrists were tied behind their back and the bindings connected to a
ligature around their neck.
At both locations the police found hair that was described
as "characteristically Negroid" in origin, as well as semen stains on
the victims' bedding. Upon analysis, the hair samples removed from
the scene were found to be "consistent with Spencer's underarm
hair". Spencer 11, at 4. Further, the testing indicated that the semen
stains on the bedding were deposited by a "secretor" (an individual
whose bodily fluids exhibit chemical traits of the person's blood). Id.
The chemical properties of the stains were found to be consistent
with those of a member of a blood group comprising about 13 percent
of the population, a group to which Spencer belongs. Id. The
prosecution had the DNA structures in the semen stains compared to
known blood samples taken from the defendant. This process
identified the semen stains and blood samples as belonging to the
same person and the court noted that the chance of mis-identification
error had a statistical probability numbering 1 in 705 million. Id. at 5.
HOLDING
In Spencer II, defendant asserted (44) separate assignments
of error, many of which the court dismissed as being without merit.
Many of the other alleged errors were dismissed as being based on
well settled areas of law, such as the claim that the death penalty
violated both the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. However, four
holdings issued by the court deserve analysis because they involve
either a new and previously undeveloped area of the law, or discuss
common error committed by defense attorneys.
The summarized holdings are: (1) That "DNA printing" is t
reliable and admissible form of identification evidence; (2) That onc(
a prima facie Batson challenge is made, the prosecution has the
burden of articulating racially neutral reasons for its exclusion of
potential jurors; (3) That the objection to the seating of a juror made
during voir dire is deemed waived unless restated immediately prior
to the actual seating of that juror; and (4) That an alleged restriction
in the defendant's cross-examination of a witness cannot be appealec
where the defense counsel failed to proffer evidence, on the record,
regarding the nature of the proposed questions and the witness's
answers to those questions.
ANALYSIS
(1) DNA PRINTING:
Spencer alleged that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence the results of a DNA analysis comparing his blood to the
semen stains found at the scene of the crimes. Spencer II, at 27.
Specifically, Spencer claimed that the prosecution had not proved thi
reliability of DNA testing procedures. Id. at 29.
